linux.git/fs, branch master

Merge tag 'v7.2-rc4-smb3-server-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/ksmbd

2026-07-25T02:50:05Z

Pull smb server fixes from Steve French: "This contains eight ksmbd fixes covering POSIX ACL handling, SMB signing enforcement, DACL parsing and construction hardening, session lifetime handling, and validation of malformed transform and compressed SMB2 requests: - preserve inherited POSIX ACL mask when creating objects. - enforce the session signing requirement for plaintext SMB requests. - harden DACL/ACE processing against size overflows, incomplete ACE copies, and undersized SIDs. - defer teardown of a previous session until NTLM authentication succeeds. - reject undersized encryption-transform and decompressed SMB2 requests before they can reach normal SMB2 request processing" * tag 'v7.2-rc4-smb3-server-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/ksmbd: ksmbd: reject undersized decompressed SMB2 requests ksmbd: validate minimum PDU size for transform requests ksmbd: defer destroy_previous_session() until after NTLM authentication ksmbd: validate ACE size against SID sub-authorities ksmbd: restore DACL size on check_add_overflow() to avoid malformed ACL ksmbd: bound DACL dedup walk to copied ACEs ksmbd: enforce signing required by the session ksmbd: preserve VFS inherited POSIX ACL mask

Merge tag 'ceph-for-7.2-rc5' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client

2026-07-24T20:22:41Z

Pull ceph fixes from Ilya Dryomov: "A bunch of assorted fixes with the majority being hardening against malformed input and invalid data scenarios that don't happen in real deployments but can be utilized to trigger use-after-free and similar issues, some error path leak fixups and two patches from Max to avoid a potential hang in __ceph_get_caps() and unintended nesting of current->journal_info while handling replies from the MDS. All marked for stable" * tag 'ceph-for-7.2-rc5' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client: ceph: avoid fs reclaim while using current->journal_info ceph: add owner/capability checks for CEPH_IOC_SET_LAYOUT* ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted rbd: Reset positive result codes to zero in object map update path libceph: bound pg_{temp,upmap,upmap_items} length to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE libceph: refresh auth->authorizer_buf{,_len} after authorizer update ceph: fix refcount leak in ceph_readdir() libceph: guard missing CRUSH type name lookup libceph: remove debugfs files before client teardown libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len ceph: fix writeback_count leak in write_folio_nounlock() libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers() ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps() libceph: Reject monmaps advertising zero monitors libceph: reject zero bucket types in crush_decode libceph: Fix multiplication overflow in decode_new_up_state_weight()

Merge tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/linux

2026-07-24T20:12:43Z

Pull fscrypt fixes from Eric Biggers: "A couple fixes for AI-detected bugs" * tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/linux: fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices() fscrypt: Add missing superblock check in find_or_insert_direct_key()

Merge tag 'v7.2-rc4-smb3-client-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6

2026-07-23T20:49:54Z

Pull smb client fixes from Steve French: - Fix leak in cifs_close_deferred_file() - Fix resolving MacOS symlinks - Fix stale file size in readdir - Update git branches in MAINTAINERS file - Fix bounds check in cifs_filldir - Fix checks in parse_dfs_referrals() - Fix DFS referral checks for malformed packet * tag 'v7.2-rc4-smb3-client-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6: cifs: fix cifsFileInfo leak on kmalloc failure in deferred close drain paths cifs: prevent readdir from changing file size due to stale directory metadata smb: client: handle STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK responses without a symlink target Add missing git branch info for cifs and ksmbd to MAINTAINERS file smb: client: bound dirent name against end of SMB response in cifs_filldir smb: client: validate DFS referral PathConsumed

ceph: avoid fs reclaim while using current->journal_info

2026-07-23T18:29:42Z

handle_reply() stores a `ceph_mds_request` pointer in `current->journal_info` while filling the inode and dentry cache from an MDS reply. An allocation in this section can enter direct reclaim and prune dentries from another filesystem. If this dirties an ext4 inode, ext4 starts a JBD2 transaction. JBD2 interprets the Ceph request in `current->journal_info` as a journal handle and dereferences the request's `r_tid` as `h_transaction`, causing a kernel crash, e.g.: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000000077b4818 [...] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 2699135 Comm: kworker/6:3 Tainted: G W 6.18.38-i3 #1113 NONE [...] Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : jbd2__journal_start+0x2c/0x208 lr : __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x100/0x178 [...] Call trace: jbd2__journal_start+0x2c/0x208 (P) __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x100/0x178 ext4_dirty_inode+0x3c/0x90 __mark_inode_dirty+0x58/0x400 iput.part.0+0x2b0/0x370 iput+0x18/0x30 dentry_unlink_inode+0xc0/0x158 __dentry_kill+0x80/0x250 shrink_dentry_list+0x90/0x130 prune_dcache_sb+0x60/0x98 super_cache_scan+0xe8/0x190 do_shrink_slab+0x174/0x388 shrink_slab+0xd8/0x4c0 shrink_node+0x31c/0x908 do_try_to_free_pages+0xd0/0x508 try_to_free_pages+0x11c/0x238 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x4d0/0xdd0 __folio_alloc_noprof+0x18/0x70 __filemap_get_folio+0x248/0x440 ceph_readdir_prepopulate+0x570/0x9e8 mds_dispatch+0x1424/0x1ba0 ceph_con_process_message+0x74/0xa0 ceph_con_v1_try_read+0x3a0/0x1510 ceph_con_workfn+0x260/0x460 Enter a scoped NOFS allocation context and leave it after clearing `journal_info`. This prevents filesystem reclaim from recursing into another filesystem while the field contains Ceph-private data. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 315f24088048 ("ceph: fix security xattr deadlock") Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

ceph: add owner/capability checks for CEPH_IOC_SET_LAYOUT*

2026-07-23T18:29:42Z

These permission checks were already missing in the initial impementation of these ioctls. This Ceph allows any user who owns a file descriptor to manipulate the layout of any file, even if they don't have write permissions. It might be a good idea to guard other ioctls with permission checks as well or even disallow regular users (even if they own the file) to manipulate layout settings completely, as this may be abused to DoS the Ceph servers, but right now, I find it most urgent to have setter checks at all. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 8f4e91dee2a2 ("ceph: ioctls") Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted

2026-07-23T18:29:42Z

A reader can hang forever in __ceph_get_caps() when the client no longer holds `FILE_RD`, but local cap state still says that the capability is already wanted (via `mds_wanted`). One way to trigger this is through MDS cap revocation. If another client performs a conflicting operation, the MDS can revoke `FILE_RD` from the reader; the next read then has to reacquire `FILE_RD`. If the cap update that should request `FILE_RD` never reaches the MDS after `cap->mds_wanted` was raised, the reader is left holding only non-file caps while local `mds_wanted` still includes the file read caps. In that state, try_get_cap_refs() sees `need <= mds_wanted` and returns 0, so __ceph_get_caps() just waits on `i_cap_wq`. If the cap update that was supposed to request `FILE_RD never reaches the MDS after `cap->mds_wanted was` raised, no further request is sent and the waiter can sleep indefinitely until unrelated cap traffic happens to wake it up. The ordering issue is that `cap->mds_wanted` is updated in __prep_cap() before the `CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS message` is actually queued for send. That makes one field serve two different meanings at once: what this client wants, and what the client believes the MDS already knows it wants. A proper fix would be to split those states and track whether a cap update is actually in flight or has been observed by the MDS. However, simply moving the `cap->mds_wanted assignment` later would not be sufficient: queueing the message in the messenger does not guarantee that the MDS processed that specific wanted set, and reconnect or message loss can still invalidate that assumption. Fixing that properly would require a larger rework of the cap state machine. To allow simpler backports to stable kernels, this patch implements a simpler workaround: - stop waiting forever in __ceph_get_caps(); after a bounded wait, fall back to the renew path - make ceph_renew_caps() issue a synchronous `OPEN` request whenever the inode still does not actually hold the wanted caps, instead of only calling ceph_check_caps() The extra issued-vs-wanted check in ceph_renew_caps() is necessary because the previous test only checked whether the inode still had any real caps at all. That is not enough after revocation: the client can still hold something like `pLs` and yet be missing `FILE_RD` completely. In that case, falling back to ceph_check_caps() is not sufficient, because it still trusts `cap->mds_wanted` and may resend nothing. By requiring `(issued & wanted) == wanted` before taking the asynchronous path, the code only uses ceph_check_caps() when the `wanted caps` are already actually issued. Otherwise, it sends the synchronous `OPEN` renew. This preserves the existing asynchronous fast path when the wanted caps are already issued, avoids changing cap-state semantics, and fixes the hang by guaranteeing that a stalled waiter eventually retries through a path that does not rely on the stale `mds_wanted` state. [ idryomov: move CEPH_GET_CAPS_WAIT_TIMEOUT from libceph.h to mds_client.h, formatting ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0a454bdd501a ("ceph: reorganize __send_cap for less spinlock abuse") Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

ceph: fix refcount leak in ceph_readdir()

2026-07-23T18:29:41Z

The ceph_readdir() function allocates a ceph_mds_request via ceph_mdsc_create_request() and stores it in dfi->last_readdir. In the directory entry processing loop, if the entry's offset is less than ctx->pos or if the inode pointer is unexpectedly NULL, the function returns -EIO without releasing the reference held by dfi->last_readdir, causing a refcount leak. Fix this by adding ceph_mdsc_put_request(dfi->last_readdir) before returning on these error paths. Also set dfi->last_readdir to NULL for safety, matching the cleanup done at the normal exit. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: af9ffa6df7e3 ("ceph: add support to readdir for encrypted names") Signed-off-by: WenTao Liang Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

ceph: fix writeback_count leak in write_folio_nounlock()

2026-07-23T18:29:41Z

write_folio_nounlock() increments fsc->writeback_count to track in-flight writeback operations. On several error paths where the function returns early (folio lookup failure, snapshot context allocation failure, and writepages submission failure), the function returns without calling atomic_long_dec_return() to decrement the counter. Each leaked increment keeps the counter above zero, which can prevent the filesystem from cleanly unmounting or suspending writes. Add atomic_long_dec_return() calls on all error paths that currently return without decrementing the counter. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d55207717ded ("ceph: add encryption support to writepage and writepages") Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()

2026-07-23T18:29:41Z

ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case: snaptrace = h + 1; snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len); p = snaptrace + snaptrace_len; ... case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT: if (snaptrace_len) { ... if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace, snaptrace + snaptrace_len, false, &realm)) { ... } ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad) with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len. With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past the legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps / ri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds reads of the encoded snap arrays. The eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks above the op switch each catch this OOB through their ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised MDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with no version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The shape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced. Validate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before consuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room() helper. The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p, guarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe for the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where p + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space. This matches the rest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines below), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit path. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a8599bd821d0 ("ceph: capability management") Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov